A Tale of Two Transitions: Cuba and Viet Nam after the Collapse of the Soviet Union by Weeks, John
 1 
 










A Tale of Two Transitions: 
Cuba and Viet Nam after the Collapse of 



















Centre for Development Policy & Research (CDPR) 
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 
Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London WC1H 0XG, United Kingdom 
Telephone: +44 (0)20 7898 4496, 









 At the end of the 1980s, the collapse of the Soviet Union brought forth drastic 
economic adjustments in some thirty countries (over half of which had not previously 
been independent).  For almost all of the countries, the adjustments would be in the 
context of a fundamental change in economic, political and social organisation, with a 
substantial minority combining this with debilitating civil wars, separatist conflicts, or 
armed border disputes.  In the short run, the governments of these countries faced an 
immediate crisis of the balance of payments.  With a few exceptions, the trade of 
these countries had been concentrated within COMECON;  in the cases of the former 
Soviet Republics trade had been largely internal to the USSR.  Thus, all but a few of 
the countries (e.g., China) encountered a common problem, to convert from 
COMECON trade to trade in ‘hard’ currencies.  
 
 This paper considers the process by which, in the short-run, two countries, 
Cuba and Viet Nam, adjusted their balance of payments position in the aftermath of 
the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Of the underdeveloped countries that were a part of 
the Soviet bloc (except for North Korea), Cuba and Viet Nam implemented the most 
extensive and comprehensive forms of central planning.  This is in contrast to the 
nominal central planning in several African countries, which was largely form rather 
than essence.  While planning may not have covered the entire economy in either 
country, the state controlled external trade in both cases.  Therefore, the transition to a 
hard currency trading regime represented a fundamental readjustment in both Cuba 
and Viet Nam. 
 
 The analysis of the transition to new trading regimes in Cuba and Viet Nam 
takes three parts.  First, the balance of payments crisis suffered by each country is 
placed in context, in comparison to other countries of the relevant region, and in 
comparison to other centrally planned states.  This is followed by sections that deal 
with Cuba’s adjustment, then that of Viet Nam.  The conclusion is reached that both 
countries adjusted with relative success, compared to other centrally planned states, 
and compared to countries in their region. 
   
 
The Crisis in Context 
 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in an economic crisis for the 
countries within the Soviet training system, which took the immediate form of a 
balance of payments crisis.  This balance of payments crisis can be distinguished 
analytically from the dismantling of mechanisms of central planning, especially since 
in almost every case, when the latter occurred, it worsened, rather than eased the 
former.  Whatever else transition to market regulation might have achieved, it did not, 
in the short run, contribute to closing trade gaps;  on the contrary, trade liberalisation 
tended to provoke an increased flow of imports, while the export response was at best 
sluggish. 
 Prior to considering the consequences for Cuban and Viet Nam of the end of 
the Soviet trading system, the relevant differences between the two countries need be 
noted.  On the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba was one of the more 
developed countries of Latin America in terms of social indicators.  While 
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calculations of per capita income are sensitive to the price set used, any reasonable 
measure implies that per capita income in Cuba was of the order of ten times that of 
Viet Nam.  While Cuba was perhaps eighty percent urban and twenty percent rural in 
1990 (depending on the definition of an urban area),1 the proportions for Viet Nam 
were the reverse.  Both countries suffered from economic and political sanctions by 
the United States, but after 1990 these were of minor importance for Viet Nam.  For 
Cuba, on the other hand, the negative impact of sanctions may well have increased in 
the 1990s, with the Helms-Burton act particularly important.   
 
The relevance of comparing two countries so different is that each pursued an 
adjustment strategy substantially different from that promoted by the Western Powers 
and the international financial institutions.  By contrast, in Central Europe2 and Russia 
adjustment was based upon ‘Washington Consensus’ macroeconomic policies, 
including rapid trade liberalisation, deregulation of capital markets, privatisation, and 
demand compression.  For the Asian states of the former Soviet Union strategies were 
more mixed, from the highly liberalising Kyrgyz Republic, to relatively non-
liberalising Uzebekistan (Weeks 1997).3 
 
 
 In order to assess the severity of the adjustment problem, Table 1 provides the 
basic indicators for Cuban and Viet Nam (with GDP growth shown graphically in 
Figure 1).  Here and below, the discussion will be in terms of two time periods, pre- 
and post-collapse of the Cold War trading regimes (1986-1989 and 1990 onwards).  
The economic performance of the two countries was quite different before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  While Cuba’s growth was quite modest, averaging less 
than two percent per annum, Viet Nam grew at a relatively robust five percent.  Viet 
Nam’s economic performance cannot be explained by a putative reform process in the 
second half of the 1980s, since GDP growth during 1980-1985 was slightly higher 
(Trâ’n Hoàng Kim 1996, p. 209). 
 
 In the four years following the collapse of the Soviet Union (1990-1993), the 
Cuban economy suffered a catastrophic decline, towards forty percent, with each 
year’s decline exceeding the previous.  By striking contrast, Viet Nam’s growth rate 
increased, to an average of seven percent annually, compared to five percent for the 
previous four years.  The proximate cause of the difference is obvious:  during 1990-
1993 Viet Nam’s trade gap fell to near zero (about one percent of GDP), while 
Cuba’s, though lower than previously, averaged seven percent of GDP.  The statistics 
in Table 1 tell a simple stylised story:  Cuban policy makers found themselves forced 
to narrow the trade gap through import compression via contraction of the economy;  
Viet Nam closed the trade gap through export growth. 
                                                          
1 For example, the communities in Cuba associated with sugar refineries should be considered 
urban in this context, though populations were small for many of them. 
2 ‘Central Europe’ refers to the independent states of the Soviet bloc:  Albania, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia (latter the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic), Hungary, Poland, and Romania.  
The German Democratic Republic disappeared into a greater Germany.  ‘Eastern’ Europe is used 
to refer to the European countries formerly part of the Soviet Union (Armenia, Belarus, Estonia, 
Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova,  and Ukraine). Falling into a category of their own are the 
European states formerly part of Yugoslavia:  Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Serbia/Bosnia. 
3 For a useful, though highly subjective ‘league table’ of liberalisers, see World Bank (1996, p. 
14). 
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 Several structural factors account for the different paths to balance of 
payments stability.  The first is shown in Figure 2.  Before the collapse of the Soviet 
trading system, Viet Nam’s economy was quite closed to international trade, with the 
average of exports and imports accounting for less than ten percent of GDP.  From 
this low base, it was possible to expand exports dramatically in the short run, as 
discussed below.  On the other hand, trade accounted for over one-third of national 
output in Cuba prior to the crisis, a ratio disproportionately high even when one 
accounts for size and development of the economy.  Thus, on a purely numerical 
basis, the possibility that Cuba could dramatically increase its exports was 
considerably less than for Viet Nam.  Second, while both countries formally suffered 
from a trade embargo with the United States, the associated sanctions were 
considerably less effective for Viet Nam.  By the early 1990s, Japan and several 
European Union countries were prepared to ignore US pressure and substantially 
increase their trade with Viet Nam.  Perhaps the single most important element in 
stimulating trade between these countries and Viet Nam was the putative discovery of 
large reserves of natural gas off the southeast coast of the country.  In addition, and 
unlike in Latin America, several of Viet Nam’s proximate neighbours (especially 
Singapore)4 increased bilateral trade, as well as direct investment.  At the same time, 
US sanctions against Cuba made expanding hard currency trade quite difficult. 
 
 The effect of these differences was an exponential growth of Vietnamese 
exports after 1990, while Cuban exports declined continuously during 1990-1993.  By 
1996, trade as a share of GDP in Viet Nam exceeded Cuba’s at its 1989 peak, and 
during 1990-1993 Cuba trade had fallen almost to Viet Nam’s pre-1990 level.  Figure 
3 shows the trade deficits of the two countries, which move in a similar manner.  The 
main difference was the very quick closure of the Vietnamese gap, to near zero during 
1990-1992, compared to a slower adjustment in Cuba.  After 1994, the trade gaps for 
both increased, reflecting a more sustainable situation, based on capital inflows in the 
case of Viet Nam, and earnings form ‘invisibles’ in the case of Cuba. 
 
 In order to evaluate the adjustment to balance of payments pressure, it is 
useful to assess the severity of the economic crisis potentially faced by each country 
in 1990.  Table 2 compares Cuba and Viet Nam to the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union (ex-SU).  During the pre-crisis 
years, 1986-1989, the average growth rate of the CEE countries was just over two 
percent, and of the ex-SU countries 3.4 percent (see Figure 4).  By comparison, 
Cuba’s growth was considerably inferior and Viet Nam’s substantially better.  During 
the crisis years, 1990-1993, the twenty-one CEE and ex-SU countries suffered severe 
declines, with the single exception of Albania (whose collapse would come in the late 
1990s).  Inspection of the table shows that the division of the countries is not merely 
geographical, for the average decline of the ex-SU states was almost three times that 
of the CEE countries.  Further, the greatest decline for the CEE countries was minus 
8.5 percent annually for Bulgaria, and only four of the fourteen ex-SU countries had 
growth declines less than this.  A statistical exercise that tests for the difference in 
growth rates shows that during 1990-1995, the ex-SU states had growth rates over 
eight percent lower than for CEE countries, significant at less than one percent (see 
Weeks 1997, pp. 4-6). 
 
                                                          
4 Some of the trade with Singapore was via local subsidiaries of US corporations. 
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 There are at least two important structural factors explaining the substantial 
differences in growth declines between the CEE and ex-SU countries.  First, the rates 
of GDP decline across the twenty-one countries are negatively related to per capita 
income (Ibid., Table 2).  The ex-SU states had income per head considerably lower 
than for the CEE countries, with the exception of Russia itself and the Baltic states.  
This tendency, for the countries with higher per capita income to perform better over 
the period, might be explained by relative ineffectiveness of  ‘shock therapy’ policies 
to relatively less developed economies. Mosley, among others, has argued that the 
liberalisation and deregulation policies of structural adjustment programmes in market 
economies are more likely to improve economic growth the higher is the level of 
development of the adjusting country (Mosley 1990).  Drawing on the work of Fei 
and Ranis (1988), he argues that the early stages of development tend to be 
characterised by policies of intervention, including import substitution, which shifts to 
an outward, export orientation as industrialisation increases.  The relative 
underdevelopment of markets in such countries limits the ability of those markets to 
transmit price incentives that such follow from liberalisation. 
 
Second, institutional characteristics of the ex-SU states provided major 
obstacles to adjustment to a market-regulated system.  These countries were in most 
cases more closely integrated to the Soviet Union in trade than for those in the CEE 
group.  Perhaps more important, the trade was organised as internal commerce, 
without the institutions for managing trade (see discussion by Griffin, 1995, Chapter 
2).  This rather obvious and trivial point implies a second, more general one:  that 
after independence these countries had to create a mechanisms of economic 
management for activities which previously had been carried out in Moscow or by 
local functionaries of the central government.  Thus, in addition to the disruption 
associated with the shift to market regulation, the former states of the Soviet Union 
found themselves lacking key institutions of economic management.  
 
 In this context, one can note that the decline of the Cuban economy during 
1990-1993 was more than double that for the CEE group, but less than for the ex-SU 
states.  This quantitative intermediate position of Cuba might be explained by 
reference to the two points discussed above.  In terms of per capita income, it was 
closer to the ex-SU states, though markets had been highly developed before the 
revolutionary seizure of power.  Because of this underdevelopment and the small size 
of the economy, there was relatively little production of capital goods and 
intermediate products for industry.  This greatly restricted the technical potential for 
substitution of domestic inputs for imported products.  More important, Cuba’s trade 
has greater concentrated with the Soviet Union than for most of the seven CEE 
countries.  As to be expected, the CEE countries with the smallest declines during 
1990-1993 were tended to be those with the least Soviet trade (e.g., Albania and 
Poland). 
 
 In summary, Cuba’s decline was substantially greater than for the CEE 
countries, and at about the median point for the ex-SU countries.  In contrast, Viet 
Nam would seem from another world:  while the CEE countries declined at an 
average of more than four percent and the ex-SU countries at twelve percent, Viet 
Nam grew at seven percent.  This difference was despite the extremely low 
development of the economy and an overwhelming concentration of trade with the 
Soviet Union before 1990.  Explanation of this phenomenal performance is discussed 
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to a subsequent section.  Returning to discussion of Cuba, Table 2 reveals a further 
important relationship.  Though Cuba’s comparative performance during 1990-1993 
was mediocre at best, and perhaps more accurately described as a collapse, the 
country’s recovery during 1994-1997 exceeded that of thirteen of the twenty-one CEE 
and ex-SU countries.  Indeed, it had a growth rate above four of the seven CEE 
countries,  This was the case even though those countries received considerable 
foreign direct investment (especially Hungary) and concessionary capital inflows 
from the International Monetary Fund, the European Development Bank, the World 
Bank, and bilateral lenders (e.g., Germany and the United States).  One can only 
speculate about the counterfactual:  what would have been Cuba’s post-crisis recovery 




Cuba’s Crisis and Adjustment 
 
 The adjustment process in Cuba occurred in the context of a severe crisis of 
the external sector.  The severity of the crisis is suggested in Table 3, which provides 
growth comparisons between Cuba and other Latin American countries from 1986 
through 1997.  During 1986-1989, Cuba’s GDP growth rate was below the Latin 
American average by almost a percentage point.  Perhaps more relevant in terms of 
social welfare, per capita growth in Cuba was above the average, exceeding that of 
twelve countries.  This highlights the severity of the decline during 1990-1993, when 
Latin American per capita income was virtually constant, but Cuba’s fell by over ten 
percent annually.  This catastrophic decline makes performance in the subsequent 
period all the more striking:  Cuban per capita income rose by over three percent per 
year, while for the other Latin American countries the increase was more than a 
percentage point less. 
 
 Tables 4-6 provide statistics to judge how impressed one should be by the 
Cuban recovery of 1994-1997.  The pressing short-term problem for the Cuban 
government was to close the trade gap.  The seriousness of the problem can be 
assessed by comparing the Cuban trade gap with that of other Latin American 
countries.  During the pre-crisis period, Cuba’s trade gap averaged over twelve 
percent of GDP.  If one excludes the Dominican Republic and Panama, both of which 
had large trade deficits for structural reasons, only the Nicaraguan and Salvadorean 
deficits approached Cuba’s in size.  Of course, this was partly the result of import-
compression throughout Latin America during the mid-1980s, associated with the 
Washington Consensus approach to debt servicing.  Still, in the Latin American 
context, the Cuban deficit was extremely large in the late 1980s, exceeded only by the 
deficits in two war-affected countries.  The qualifier, ‘in the Latin American context’, 
is quite important.  The Cuban deficit was not notably large by comparison to those in 
many sub-Saharan countries, for whom deficits in excess of twenty percent of GDP 
were not uncommon (Weeks 1998).  The deficit was sustained in whole or part, 
before 1990, by concessionary lending (‘foreign aid’) from the Soviet Union, explicit 
and implicit.  The implied level of assistance was quite high by Latin American 
comparison, but not by African comparison.  For example, during 1990-1994 seven of 
the twenty Eastern, Central and Southern African countries received concessionary 
aid in excess of twenty percent of GDP (Weeks ibid.). 
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External finance for the balance of payments was quite important for several 
Latin American countries, as Table 5 shows.  Without entering into the debate over 
the size of Soviet aid to the Cuban economy, we see from Table 5 that during 1986-
1989, four Latin American countries received IMF and World Bank loans as a 
proportion of GDP equal to or greater than Cuba’s trade deficit.  During the 1990s, 
when import compression was forced upon the Cuban government, on average other 
Latin American countries received IMF and World Bank support as a portion of GDP 
greater than Cuba’s trade deficit.  It is an obvious conclusion that had Cuba had 
access to foreign borrowing at the level of the average Latin American country (or 
even below), considerably less import compression would have been necessary. 
 
 As a consequence of the lack of external finance, during 1991-1993 the Cuban 
economy suffered a contraction which was probably unprecedented in Latin America 
in this century.  Table 6 provides a ‘league table’ of Latin American economic 
contractions since 1980, for one-year, two-year, and three-year periods.  The 
contraction of the Cuban economy in 1993 (minus fifteen percent) is second to that of 
Panama for 1988, but Cuba’s two year decline, 1992-1993, is nine percentage points 
above the next highest (Nicaragua, 1988-1989).  Only the Peruvian collapse of 1988-
1990 approaches Cuba’s three-year decline of thirty-six percent (1991-1993).  The 
table also provides growth rates for the three years following the two- and three-year 
declines, to allow inspection of relative performance in recovery.5  Comparing across 
two-year declines, Panama had the fastest recovery rate, followed by Cuba, with Chile 
close behind.  For comparisons across the thirteen three year declines, the Cuban 
recovery rate stands in fourth place. 
 
 Without external finance and export-constrained by US sanctions (in contrast 
to Viet Nam), the Cuban government had no choice but to achieve external balance 
through output contraction.  Table 7 shows that the burden of adjustment was placed 
on investment and, to a lesser extent, private consumption.  In 1996, when recovery 
was in process, total GDP remained twenty-six percentage points below the average 
of 1987-1989, with investment seventy-five percentage points down.6  The fall in 
investment is further indicated by imports of capital goods, which declined form 
about a quarter of total imports during 1987-1990, to less than five percent in 1993 
and 1994 (last row of Table 7).  For consumption, the private sector component fell 
considerably more than the public sector (thirty-three compared to fifteen percentage 
points).  These percentages reveal a conscious strategy of the government to sustain 
the supply of essential public goods during the adjustment process.  Viet Nam, facing 
more favourable external conditions, was able to pursue an adjustment through 
growth strategy.  Unable to do this, the Cuban government opted for minimising the 
social impact of adjustment. 
 
 As a result, the recovery of the Cuban economy was on the basis of excess 
capacity, with little new investment.  In the medium term this strategy could not be 
sustained, as capital equipment deteriorated, and its obsoleteness resulted in lower 
competitiveness in key sectors (notably in sugar).  By reducing output, especially 
                                                          
5 A simple regression test provides no support for the hypothesis that growth rates during 
recovery are correlated with rates during the decline, either positively or negatively (the test 
statistics are not significant). 
6 At its nadir in 1993, investment fell in real terms to fourteen percent of the 1987-1989 average. 
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investment, the trade deficit could be narrowed, from almost US three billion dollars 
in 1989, to eight hundred million in 1994 (see Table 8).  However, without Soviet aid 
or access to external borrowing, even this deficit level could not be sustained.  As is 
well-know, the remaining deficit was covered by earnings from tourism, which rose 
form less than US$ 400 million during 1989-1991, to well over one billion in the mid-
1990s.  By 1994, tourist revenue slightly exceeded the trade deficit, though not in 
1995 and 1996.  During the latter years inflows of direct foreign investment provided 
the foreign exchange cover for the increase in imports 
. 
 However, because of the low level of investment during the crisis and 
recovery, it is doubtful that the Cuban economy was less import-dependent than it had 
been in the 1980s.  On the contrary, the rapid increase in tourism implied that in the 
short and medium term, the economy became more import-using at the margin.  It 
follows that that Cuba’s recovery involved relatively little structural change in the 
medium term, and should not be considered sustainable.  By the end of the 1990s, the 
government faced a challenge equal to that of overcoming the crisis of the first half of 
the 1990s:  to restructure the economy to make it less import-using in tourism, while 
developing new export sectors to replace sugar.  Extraction and export of nickel 
proved to be the most successful of the latter in the 1990s. 
 
 The analysis of the Cuban crisis and subsequent recovery can be summarised 
as follows.  Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cuban economy declined 
by considerably more than the economies of Central and Eastern Europe, but less than 
for the former members of the Soviet Union.  One might explain these differences by 
the degree to which countries had their trade concentrated within the Soviet Bloc.  
The severity of Cuba’s economic decline was the result of a trade deficit rendered 
unsustainable by the end of Soviet aid, and the contraction of exports to the Soviet 
Bloc.  Had Cuba enjoyed access to the Bretton Woods institutions (or international 
capital markets), the output contraction associated with the trade deficit would have 
been considerably less.  Not withstanding this lack of access, recovery from the sharp 
output contraction was relatively rapid.  However, this recovery involved little 
structural change, and could not be considered sustainable into the new century. 
 
 
Adjustment in Viet Nam 
 
 Compared to the Cuban story, the Vietnamese tale of transition is quite simple.  
As Table 9 shows, the country’s growth rate prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union 
was about two-thirds that of the average for the so-called High Performing Asian 
Economies (HPAE, see World Bank 1993a).  Over the next four years, the 
Vietnamese growth rate exceeded that of the HPAEs, and Viet Nam had the fastest 
growing economy in East and Southeast Asia during 1994-1997, with the exception of 
China.  Viet Nam achieved this growth performance, first, by closing the trade gap 
through export growth, then, by combining export growth inflows of capital (see 
Table 10).  In every year, 1991-1995, capital inflows to Viet Nam exceeded the trade 
gap, a notable contrast with the situation for Cuba. 
 
 In this context, the World Bank, in its 1993 report on Viet Nam, commented 
that 'Viet Nam has shown strong growth throughout its adjustment program'.  It went 
on to write, 'Viet Nam's recent economic success is attributable to an ambitious 
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adjustment and reform program which it has undertaken without significant support 
from outside' (World Bank 1993b, pp. iii & i).  While both these statements are true, 
what distinguished the case of Viet Nam was the central role played by the state in 
managing the transition, rather than leaving adjustment to the dictates of the market.  
The World Bank interpretation of the Vietnamese stabilisation success was that policy 
makers achieved price stability through implementation of tight monetary and fiscal 
policy.  IN the World Bank view, the reduction of bank financing of the government 
deficit was especially important.  This interpretation is also suggested by Irvin:  'a 
problem [i.e., inflation] -- it is argued -- rectified mainly by the adoption of an IMF-
style stabilisation package in 1989' (Irvin 1994, pp. 5-6).   
 
A review of macroeconomic indicators suggests a different interpretation of 
what happened in Viet Nam during 1989-1992 (see Table 11).  As discussed above, 
before the stabilisation programme of 1989, Viet Nam's GDP growth rate was quite 
high for countries in transition.  At an average of five percent per year during 1986-
1989, national income increased significantly faster than population growth.  This 
statistic is important, because stabilisation is considerably easier to achieve when 
growth performance is strong.  Second, the stabilisation period, 1989-1992, did not see 
a large reduction in the fiscal deficit compared to the previous four years.  During 
1989-1991 the fiscal deficit was a higher proportion of GDP than during 1986-1988, 
yet the rate of inflation fell dramatically:  for 1986-1988 inflation averaged over 350 
percent a year, and for 1989-1991 the average was less than seventy percent.  While it 
is true that a very low deficit in 1992 was associated with inflation of less than forty 
percent, a lower deficit the year before coincided with inflation twice as high.  
Therefore, one cannot construct a credible story that links the decline in inflation to 
the reduction of the deficit. 
 
Changes in the trade deficit provide a more convincing explanation of the 
successful stabilisation.  In Table 11 shows that during 1985-1988, the trade deficit 
averaged almost 100 per cent of exports (imports were double exports).  Then, for 
1990-1992, it fell to an average of less than three percent of exports (and less than one 
percent of GDP).  Table 12 shows that the trade deficit was almost eliminated by the 
dramatic increases in exports of marine products, rice, and petroleum, with the latter 
two products close to zero in 1985-1986.  The expansion of petroleum exports might 
be interpreted as the good luck of being endowed with this resource.  However, the 
phenomenal increase in rice exports, from zero in 1988 to over US$ 400 million in 
1992, occurred as a result of government policy.7  While the increase in rice exports 
reflected a dramatic increase in production, the expansion of marine product exports 
involved a diversion from domestic consumption.8  These three products together 
accounted for nine percent of total exports in 1985, then rose to almost half in 1989. 
 
 Viet Nam's success in transition can be explained as a process of export-led 
stabilisation (see Figure 10).  Faced with an unsustainable balance of payments 
                                                          
7The system of interventions is briefly described in World Bank 1993, p. 130.  Rice production 
increased from an average of less than sixteen million tons during 1985-1987, to over twenty 
million during 1990-1992 (Trâ’n Hoàng Kim 1996, p. 302). 
8 Rice production increased from an average of less than sixteen million tons during 1985-1987, to 
over twenty million during 1990-1992, or twenty-nine percent.  The increase for marine products 
was just over four percent for the same years (Trâ’n Hoàng Kim 1996, p. 302, 322). 
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position in the mid-1980s, the government embarked upon a policy that had two 
aspects:  institutional reform to make the economy responsive to standard 
macroeconomic instruments in the medium-term, and emergency measures to increase 
exports to stabilise the economy in the short-term.  Expansion of petroleum exports 
would not have been sufficient, in itself, to achieve external balance; nor could rice or 
marine products alone have done this.  But, the combination of the three, along with 
capital inflows, stabilised the exchange rate by 1992.  In the subsequent two years the 
dong appreciated considerably, from a high of around 13,000 to the dollar to below 
11,000 in 1993.  The exchange rate movements made the task of controlling inflation a 
relatively easy one.  Once the economy entered into an export-led stabilisation 
process, it was possible for the authorities to maintain a relatively expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policy. 
 
 The standard stabilisation package, implemented with little success in the 
transitional economies of Europe, calls for demand reduction through restrictive 
monetary and fiscal policy.  This was not the policy implemented in Viet Nam.  On the 
contrary, economic management in Viet Nam placed growth as the first priority.  By 
maintaining, then increasing, export growth, the government was able to stabilise the 
exchange rate and bring inflation under control.  The circumstances of each country in 
transition are different, so it is dangerous to attempt to draw general lessons from the 
experience of one country.  However, the success of Viet Nam can be placed in wider 
context.  First, considerable accumulated evidence from IMF programmes over several 
decades indicates that balance of payments adjustment and reduction of inflation are 
more easily achieved in a growing economy that through restriction of demand (Pastor 
1987).  Second, it would seem obvious that institutional reforms aimed at creating 
markets and linking nominal to real variables should precede stabilisation measures.  
The process of transition is not one of  'awakening markets',9 but rather of constructing 
the institutional mechanisms by which producers can respond to policy measures.  In 
this context it is a misinterpretation to refer to the pre-1989 reforms in Viet Nam as a 
'half-hearted attempt' (Leipziger 1992, p. 1);  on the contrary, the reforms of the mid-
1980s initiated the process of transforming the economy from central planning to 
market regulation. 
 
 After 1992 the trade deficit began to rise, reaching close to twenty percent of 
GDP in 1997.  In the absence of permanent non-trade flows of foreign exchange, a 
deficit of this size is difficult, if not impossible, to sustain.  Kokko and Sjöholm 
interpret the growth of the trade deficit to be an indicator of the much deeper problem 
of the failure of the government to pursue reform of the economy: 
 
…[D]uring the past couple of years, it has become increasingly well 
understood that it may not be possible to sustain the gains of the doi moi 
program unless a second generation of structural reforms is introduced. 
 Most of the structural weaknesses in the Vietnamese economy are related 
to a development strategy that is based on import substituting state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs).  These weaknesses have recently been manifested in a 
trade deficit corresponding to some 15 percent of GDP, weak profitability in 
SOEs, and the virtual absence of a modern, private industrial sector. (Kokko 
and Sjöholm 1997, p. iv) 
                                                          
9This is the title of World Bank working paper on Viet Nam by Leipziger (1992). 
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The quotation is confusing, with its allusion to an unspecified consensus 
(‘increasingly well understood’) and undefined term (‘second generation of structural 
reforms’).  However, the implication is clear:  that the trade deficit (along with other 
maladies) results from the Vietnamese government pursuing a development strategy at 
odds with the current mainstream emphasis upon a relatively passive role for the 
state.10  It may or may not be the case that the Vietnamese government would be well-
advised to pursue vigorously privatisation and market liberalisation;  given the 
economy’s performance in the 1980s and 1990s without these measures, some might 
hesitate to make such a generalisation.  Since the authors provide no quantitative 
evidence to relate it to the ownership structure of the economy, the specific link 
between state-led growth and the trade deficit can be considered an interesting, but 
unsubstantiated hypothesis. 
 
 The speculative nature of this hypothesis is all the greater, because macro data 
offer a much more obvious explanation of the growth of the trade deficit:  movements 
in the real exchange rate and the growth of direct foreign investment.  If one takes 
1989 as an index of one hundred, and an increase represents a devaluation, a standard 
purchasing power parity measure of the real exchange rate was twenty-one in 1986.11  
By 1993 the exchange rate had appreciated to sixty-five, falling to fifty in 1996 (see 
Figure 11).  Given the decentralisation of decision-making in state enterprises during 
the 1990s, an appreciating exchange rate would have encouraged imports and 
discouraged exports.  In the household sector, the appreciation would have provided 
incentives for consumption of imported commodities.  Also during the 1990s, foreign 
direct investment increased dramatically as a portion of GDP (see Table 10), and a 
large part of this increase financed imports, especially for construction.  Table 13 
reports the results of two regression exercises.  Both derive from the simple 
formulation, 
 
 xnt = xnt(RERt, FDIt), where xnt is net exports, RERt the real exchange rate, 
    and FDIt the share of foreign investment in GDP. 
 
In the first estimation, FDI is treated as a binary variable, assuming the value of unity 
when foreign direct investment rises above one percent of GDP.  In the second 
calculation, the numerical values are used.  In both cases the estimation explains over 
sixty percent of the variation in net exports, there is an absence of serial correlation, 
and the coefficients are of the predicted sign (and significant).  While one should 
hesitate to draw conclusions from regressions with nine degrees of freedom, Table 13 
provides prima facie evidence for causal relationships well-known in economic 
theory:  appreciating exchange rates tend to worsen a country’s trade balance, and 
foreign direct investment tends to finance imports rather than domestic costs. 
                                                          
10 For example, the authors write, 
We suggest that the alternative where development is built on large centrally controlled 
SOEs [state owned enterprises] would lead to the emergence of domestic oligopolies and 
monopolies, a concentration of resources to areas where Vietnamese comparative 
advantages are weak, a reduction of foreign capital inflows, and a significant fall in the 
growth rate. (Kokko and Sjöholm 1997, p. iv, emphasis in the original) 
 
11 The real exchange rate in this case is measure as the nominal exchange rate for the dong times 
the ratio of the US wholesale price index to the Vietnamese GDP deflator. 
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 Viet Nam’s adjustment to the collapse of the Soviet trading system can be 
explained in terms of short-term measures of expediency taken within a longer term 
strategy of state-led development.  It remains to be seen if the latter can be sustained 
remains to be seen.   However, it is clear that the short-term measures were successful.  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s the government used a range of interventions to 
force a higher ratio of exports to GDP, combining this with exchange rate devaluation.  
By the mid-1990s, tactics had shifted to fostering foreign direct investment and 
negotiating concessional capital flows from multilateral institutions (including the 
Asian Development Bank).  This shift in policy resulted in a rapid increase in the trade 
deficit.  Given the size of that deficit in 1997, it is likely that policy will shift back to 






 It is generally recognised that the 1980s and 1990s were characterised by 
considerable economic instability of the world economy.  During these two decades 
underdeveloped countries, particularly the high-indebted, passed through process of 
adjustment that involved severe social costs.  For most of these countries, external 
assistance for the adjustment process required governments to accept the conditions of 
the so-called Washington Consensus.  The key features of this ‘Consensus’ were 
sharp and rapid reductions in fiscal deficits, restrictive monetary policy, trade 
liberalisation, reduction of state interventions in domestic markets, and privatisation 
of public enterprises.  By the late 1990s, even mainstream commentators accepted that 
this orthodox approach had been ‘incomplete’ and ‘sometimes misguided’.12  
 
 Viet Nam and Cuba had governments which did not endorse the Consensus 
policies, even when they were being pressed upon governments throughout the 
underdeveloped world.  Explaining why they did not, when virtually all other 
governments did is beyond the scope of this chapter.  However, it is clear that the 
economies of both countries did not suffer the extreme collapse suffered in Central 
and Eastern Europe and Russia.  In Viet Nam’s case, performance was considerably 
better than even the most spectacular ‘high performers’.  While Cuba’s adjustment 
and subsequent recovery could at best be described as modestly successful in terms of 
growth, by comparison to relevant alternative country strategies, it emerged form 
crisis less scarred and devastated.  In the case of Cuba, it remains problematical how 
recovery will become sustainable growth. 
 
 Neither country provides a clear alternative strategy of adjustment, which 
could be generally followed in place of the Consensus orthodoxy.  However, the 
relative failure of the latter in many countries, and the relative success of the former 
heterodoxies in two countries, suggests that there is a wide range of macroeconomic 
policies which governments can employ in face of severe balance of payments crises. 
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Basic Economic Indicators for Cuba and Viet Nam, 1986-1998 
A. Cuba     
 GDP crr US$   Nominal 
Years growth exports imports TB/GDP Par Rate 
1986 1.8 5322 7596 -12.3 na 
1987 -1.6 5401 7612 -12.2 na 
1988 4.8 5518 7579 -10.8 na 
1989 1.5 5400 8140 -14.3 na 
1990 -3.1 5415 7417 -10.2 na 
1991 -9.4 2980 4234 -7.7 na 
1992 -11.6 1779 2315 -3.2 19.5 
1993 -14.9 1137 2037 -6.0 42.5 
1994 0.7 1314 1956 -4.2 105.0 
1995 2.5 1526 2088 -3.5 32.1 
1996 7.8 1966 3438 -8.2 19.2 
1997 4.0 2120 3743 -8.4 20.8 
1998 5.0 2519 4582 -9.9 18.8 
Sources:  CEPAL (1996), Banco Nacional de Cuba (1996 & 1997), 
Ministry of Economy & Planning (1997 & 1998), Ministerio de Educación 
Superior (1996), Morris (1997 & 1998), and Triana (1997). 
 
 
B. Viet Nam     
 GDP crr US$ Crr US$  PPP 
Years growth exports imports TB/GDP Exch rate 
1986 2.0 494 1121 -5.2 21 
1987 3.7 610 1184 -4.7 15 
1988 5.9 733 1412 -5.4 23 
1989 8.0 1320 1670 -2.6 100 
1990 5.1 1731 1772 -0.3 80 
1991 6.0 2042 2105 -0.4 83 
1992 8.6 2475 2535 -0.4 79 
1993 8.1 2985 3532 -3.2 65 
1994 8.8 4045 5244 -6.4 59 
1995 9.5 5198 7543 -11.5 53 
1996 9.4 7330 10,480 -14.1 50 
1997 9.0 7200 11,700 -18.5 51 
1998 na na na na na 
Sources: Trâ’n Hoàng Kim (1996), Kokko & Sjöholm (1997).  The data for 
calendar year 1997 were provided from the Bank of Viet Nam, via the 




GDP Growth Rates, Formerly Centrally Planned Countries,  
Cuba & Viet Nam, 1986-1997 
Region & country  1986-89 1990-93 1994-97 
Central & Eastern Europe   
1. Albania  3.1 2.9 4.4 
2. Bulgaria  4.7 -8.5 -3.4 
3. Czech Republic  2.3 -5.7 3.3 
4. Hungary  1.7 -3.3 2.3 
5. Poland  2.5 -2.9 5.8 
6. Romania  -2.4 -5.9 3.3 
7. Slovak Republic  2.5 -7.1 6.2 
average  2.1 -4.3 3.1 
Former USSR     
1. Armenia  2.9 -23.7 6.2 
2. Azerbaijan  -3.0 -17.7 -5.4 
3. Belarus  6.9 -5.5 -3.8 
4. Estonia  2.7 -12.1 2.4 
5. Georgia  -2.1 -27.3 3.9 
6. Kazakstan  1.0 -8.5 -6.1 
7. Kyrgyz Republic  6.4 -8.6 -4.4 
8. Latvia  4.5 -14.6 1.2 
9. Lithuania  7.4 -12.5 3.0 
10. Tajikistan  2.6 -13.0 -13.7 
11. Ukraine  3.2 -9.0 -12.6 
12. Uzbekistan  6.1 -3.0 -0.1 
13. Russian Federation  3.0 -7.9 -6.2 
14. Mongolia  5.5 -6.5 na 
average  3.4 -12.1 -2.7 
Cuba  1.6 -9.7 3.8 
No. < Cuba  (4) (7) (13) 
Viet Nam  4.9 6.9 9.2 
No. < Viet Nam  (15) (21) (20) 
Other     
China  9.1 10.4 10.7 
Laos*  3.9 5.9 7.7 
Notes:   
Lagos, through 1995.   
Omitted due to incomplete data: 
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldavia, Slovenia, 
Turkmenistan, and Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro). 
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators 1997 (CD-ROM), 




Latin America:  Annual Average Growth of GDP and GDP Per Capita  
by Time Periods, 1986-1997 
Periods: 
Countries 









2. Bolivia  1.5 4.2 4.0 
3. Brazil  3.7 -0.2 3.8 
4. Chile  7.3 6.9 6.6 
5. Colombia  4.8 3.8 4.8 
6. Costa Rica  4.9 5.0 2.2 
7. Dominican Republic 6.0 1.7 5.2 
8. Ecuador  1.9 3.4 3.0 
9. El Salvador 1.3 5.7 4.8 
10.Guatemala  2.9 3.9 3.5 
11. Honduras  3.9 3.8 2.5 
12. Mexico  0.7 2.9 2.1 
13.Nicaragua  -3.9 0.0 4.4 
14. Panama  -2.6 7.0 3.7 
15.Paraguay  4.1 2.8 2.8 
16.Peru  -0.6 1.3 7.4 
17. Uruguay  4.5 3.5 3.9 
18. Venezuela  1.8 5.7 0.7 
Average  2.4 3.7 3.8 
Cuba  1.6 -9.7 3.8 
(no. < Cuba)  (7) (0) (7) 
GDP per 
capita growth 
    
Latin America  0.0 0.2 1.9 
Cuba  0.5 -10.5 3.2 
(no. < Cuba)  (12) (0) (16) 
Note:  Countries with lower growth rates lower than Cuba’s have 
their numbers in bold. 
Sources:  CEPAL (1991 & 1997). 
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Table 4: 
Latin America:  Merchandise Trade Deficit 
As Proportion of GDP, 1986-1996 
Country  1986-89 1990-93 1994-96 
Argentina  3.5 1.7 -0.4 
Bolivia  0.4 -2.3 -0.3 
Brazil  4.0 3.0 0.7 
Chile  6.7 2.1 1.7 
Colombia  2.9 2.2 -4.0 
Costa Rica  -1.0 -5.3 -4.9 
Dominican Republic -15.0 -21.9 -38.2 
Ecuador  4.1 6.3 2.2 
El Salvador -9.4 -14.9 -15.1 
Guatemala -3.0 -6.9 -7.0 
Honduras  -1.9 -5.5 -11.1 
Mexico  3.1 -2.8 -1.0 
Nicaragua  -16.3 -24.7 -20.4 
Panama  -47.6 -75.5 -81.3 
Paraguay  3.5 -9.8 -17.8 
Peru  0.2 -0.7 -2.8 
Uruguay  3.9 0.1 -3.8 
Venezuela  3.9 9.6 11.1 
average  -3.2 -8.1 -10.7 








     
Cuba  -12.4 -6.8 -5.3 
(No. > Cuba) (1) (4) (5) 
Note:  Country figures greater than Cuba in bold.  Borders indicate non-
relevant comparisons. 
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators, CD-ROM (where 
there are errors), and CEPAL 1997. 
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Table 5: 
Latin America:  IMF and World Bank (IBRD & IDA)  
Loans as a Proportion of GDP, 1986-1995 
     
Country  1986-89 1990-93 1994-95 
Argentina  5.2 2.9 3.4 
Bolivia  15.0 17.3 18.6 
Brazil  3.8 2.1 1.0 
Chile  12.4 7.5 3.2 
Colombia  10.1 7.6 3.6 
Costa Rica  11.7 7.1 4.1 
Dominican Republic 8.5 4.5 4.3 
Ecuador  10.9 8.1 6.8 
El Salvador 5.0 3.6 3.7 
Guatemala  4.7 3.1 1.2 
Honduras  17.4 22.9 24.7 
Mexico  7.4 5.9 8.2 
Nicaragua  2.8 8.3 12.7 
Panama  16.5 9.5 4.4 
Paraguay  9.4 4.5 2.5 
Peru  9.0 5.4 4.8 
Uruguay  8.6 4.8 3.2 
Venezuela  0.7 7.8 6.3 
average  8.8 7.4 6.5 
(> Cuban TDDef)  (4) (9) (6) 
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators 1997 (CD-




League Table, Negative Growth Rates of GDP in Latin America after 1980 
  Year(s) Cumulative  
One year declines > 5.0:   
1. Panama  1988 -16.0  
2. Cuba  1993 -14.9  
3. Chile  1982 -14.1  
4. Nicaragua  1988 -13.4  
5. Cuba  1992 -11.6  
6. Peru  1989 -11.5  
7. Peru  1983 -10.9  
8. Uruguay  1982 -9.4  
9. Cuba  1991 -9.4  
10. Bolivia  1983 -8.6  
11. Peru  1988 -8.4  
12. El Salvador  1981 -8.3  
13. Venezuela  1989 -7.9  
14. Ecuador  1987 -7.3  
15. Costa Rica  1982 -7.3  
16. Bolivia  1982 -6.6  
17. Mexico  1995 -6.6  
18. Argentina  1981 -6.2  
19. El Salvador 1982 -5.6  
20. Venezuela  1983 -5.6  
21. Mexico  1983 -5.3  
22. Dominican Republic 1990 -5.2  
23. Peru  1990 -5.1 Following 
Two year declines > 10.0:  3 years 
1. Cuba  1992-93 -26.5 4.8 
2. Nicaragua 1988-89 -17.5 0.2 
3. Peru  1989-90 -16.6 2.6 
4. Panama  1988-89 -16.3 7.9 
5. Bolivia  1982-83 -15.2 -2.4 
6. Chile  1982-83 -14.8 4.7 
7. Uruguay  1982-83 -14.4 2.7 
8. El Salvador 1981-82 -13.9 0.9 
9. Argentina 1981-82 -11.4 0.2 
Three year declines (all):    
1. Cuba  1991-93 -35.9 4.8 
2. Peru  1988-90 -25.0 2.6 
3. Nicaragua 1987-89 -18.2 0.2 
4. Bolivia  1982-84 -18.9 -0.3 
5. Uruguay  1982-84 -16.2 6.0 
6. Nicaragua 1986-88 -15.1 -1.2 
7. El Salvador 1981-83 -14.6 1.3 
8. Bolivia  1983-85 -13.3 1.0 
9. Venezuela 1983-85 -7.3 5.4 
10. Argentina 1988-90 -7.6 8.4 
11. Bolivia  1984-86 -7.2 2.8 
12. Nicaragua 1984-86 -6.5 -6.1 
13. Nicaragua 1985-87 -5.8 -5.9 
Note:  For two and three year declines, growth must be negative in each year. 








         =100, 
Item: 1987-89 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1996 = 
Investment 2.5 -2.8 -45.9 -58.3 -39.7 5.8 58.1 10.1 25 
Consumption 2.1 -3.9 -11.7 -13.2 -5.8 0.8 0.7 2.5 73 
public 2.2 -0.1 -10.5 -5.2 -1.1 -1.9 -0.4 1.9 85 
private 2.0 -6.0 -12.5 -18.7 -9.6 3.1 1.6 3.0 67 
GDP 2.2 -3.0 -10.7 -11.6 -14.9 0.7 2.5 7.8 74 
Investment 
goods as % 
         
of tot imports 24 27 22 8 4 3 6 na  




Merchandise Exports and Imports and Tourist Earnings, 1989-1996 
(current US dollars, millions) 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Exports, goods 5392 5415 2980 1779 1137 1315 1479 1849 
imports, goods 8124 7417 4233 2315 2037 2111 2772 3493 
trade balance -2732 -2002 -1253 -536 -900 -796 -1293 -1644 
tourist earnings 319 347 387 567 720 850 1100 1380 


















Source:  CEPAL 1997, p., 34, 37. 
 22 
Table 9: 
East & Southeast Asia:  Growth of GDP and  
GDP Per Capita by Time Periods, 1986-1997 
Periods: 
Countries 
 1986-89 1990-93 1994-97 
1. Hong Kong 8.2 5.0 4.9 
2. Indonesia 5.8 6.5 7.6 
3. Korea  9.8 7.1 7.9 
4. Malaysia  5.9 8.3 9.1 
5. Philippines 5.0 1.2 4.8 
6. Singapore 7.6 7.6 8.4 
7. Thailand  9.6 8.7 7.9 
Average  7.4 6.3 7.2 
Viet Nam  4.9 6.9 9.2 
(No. < Viet Nam) (0) (3) (7) 
Note:  Countries with lower growth rates have their numbers in bold. 
Sources:  World Bank, World Development Indicators 1997 (CD-
ROM) and United Nations (1997). 
 
 
Table 10:   
Viet Nam:  Official Development Assistance  
And Direct Foreign Investment, 1990-1995 
 Bilateral Forg Dir IBRD& IMF  
Years Aid/GDP Inv/GDP IDA/GDP Credits/GDP Total 
1990 na 0.8 0.0 na na 
1991 2.5 1.5 0.6 0.0 4.6 
1992 5.8 1.6 0.6 0.0 8.0 
1993 2.0 1.7 0.4 0.0 4.1 
1994 5.9 5.6 1.2 1.8 14.5 
1995 4.1 8.7 1.1 1.9 15.8 
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators 1997 (CD-ROM) for aid, 





Table 11:  
Viet Nam:  Indicators of External and Internal Balance, 1985-1992 
 T-G X-M  GDP 
Year/Item GDP Opts Inflation growth 
1985 -12.0 -82.7 192 5.7 
1986 -4.7 -126.7 487 2.0 
1987 -4.1 -94.1 317 3.7 
1988 -7.7 -92.6 311 5.9 
1989 -11.4 -26.5 76 8.0 
1990 -8.0 -2.4 29 5.1 
1991 -2.5 -3.1 83 6.0 
1992 -3.8 -2.4 38 8.6 
Annual Averages 
1985-88 -7.1 -99.0 326 4.3 
1989-92 -6.4 -8.6 57 6.9 
 
Definitions: 
 (T-G)/GDP -- ratio of the budget deficit to GDP 
 (X-M)/X -- ratio of the trade deficit to exports 
  
Source:  Ran Hong Kim 1992 and World Bank 1993. 
 
 
Table 12:   
Viet Nam's Foreign Trade, 1985-1992 
(Exports & imports in millions of US dollars) 



















1985 497      68%    -406 0 0 45 22 9.1% 
1986 494 62 -627 0 0 95 65 19.2 
1987 610 71 -574 0 30 113 30 23.4 
1988 733 63 -679 0 79 124 18 27.7 
1989 1320 74 -350 316 200 133 20 49.2 
1990 1731 73 -41 272 34 220 20 30.4 
1991 2042 98 -63 225 96 285 204 29.7 
1992 2475 100 -60 420 141 302 321 30.0 
 
Notes: Percent conv’ble -- percentage of exports in convertible currency 
 Xp – Mp = trade balance 
Source:  World Bank (1993, pp. 239-240). 
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Table 13: 
Viet Nam:  The Trade Balance in GDP, as a Function of the PPP 
Exchange Rate, Shift Variable (1992-97), and Foreign Direct 
Investment, 1986-1997 









Ln[real exch rate] -1.296 -3.46 .007 
Shift (after 1992) 2.223 4.52 .001 
Adj R-sq = .696 
F = 13.62 
Sign. of F = .002 
D-W = 1.666 









Ln[real exch rate] 11.750 4.21 .002 
Ln[DFI/GDP] -3.077 -4.65 .001 
Adj R-sq = .646 
F = 11.02 
Sign. of F = .004 
D-W = 1.806 
DF = 9 
Note:  When the logarithmic form is used, the trade balance must be made a positive 




























Cuba & Vietnam:  Trade ([X+M]/2) 
























































Growth Rates:  Former Centrally Planned Countries, 






















Cuba & Viet Nam:  Trade Balance 


























































GDP Growth Rates:  East & Southeast Asian Average 







































Cuba:  Import Compresson and Export Expansion (negative)










































































Cuba:  Trade Deficit Reduction by Net Import 
Compression plus Tourism after 1989 


































Vietnam:  Import Compression (negative) and Export Expansion 






























Viet Nam:  Indices of the Real Exchange Rate 
and the Trade Balance in GDP, 1986-1997
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